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The Aspect of Water Supplies in the British
Policy towards Egypt and Sudan: the Role of
the Nile in Relations between Great Britain
and France at the End of the 19th Century
Jakub Mazanec
The goal of this article is to analyse the “blue thread” of the need to secure supplies of
water for Egypt, which pervades the British imperial policy and also impacts interna-
tional relations from the end of the 1880s, particularly in relation to France. This article
works with Terje Tveds theory about the importance of the irrigation water for British
interests in Egypt and about the motivation of British to invade Sudan when Egypt
reached its water limits. Another problem which is discussed in this article is the possi-
ble role of Nile waters in the Fashoda Incident (1898) which is frequently considered as
a symbol of British-French competition in North-East Africa and also the French plans
on the Nile in general.
[Nile; Egyptian Irrigation; British Interests in Egypt; Egyptian Cotton; Fashoda Incident;
Occupation of Sudan]
“‘When1 eventually, the waters of the Nile, from the Lakes to the sea, are
brought fully under control, it will be possible to boast that Man, in this
case the Englishman, has turned the gifts of Nature to the best possible ad-
vantage.”2 This observation by Evelyn Baring, British Consul General
and Agent in Egypt during the 1883–1907 period, from his book Mod-
ern Egypt, indicates to what extent the British understood the Nile’s
 Department of General History, Faculty of Arts, Charles University, Nám. J. Palacha
2, 116 38 Prague 1, Czech Republic. E-mail: jakmazanec@gmail.com.
1 This article was published with the financial support of a grant provided by GA UK
No. 292217 titled “Water Projects on the Nile in the 19th century and their Role in the
Relations between France and Britain” addressed at the Faculty of Arts at the Charles
University.
2 CROMER (E. BARING),Modern Egypt, Vol. 2, London 1908, p. 461.
41
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
West Bohemian Historical Review IX j 2019 j 1
important to Egypt and also the importance of the river’s role in their
concept of the empire.
Securing supplies of water for Egypt gradually became a key ele-
ment of the British policy – but why and when did this occur? Were
the ideas regarding utilisation of the enormous potential of the water
in the Nile on one hand and the limits of its use in Egypt on the other
hand one of the main reasons why the British occupied Sudan, as Nor-
wegian historian and geographer Terje Tvedt states, to the contrary of
the “mainstream” theory that this occupation was the result of British
“concerns about borders” arising as a result of competition between
European powers in the region?3
The goal of this article is to analyse the “blue thread” of the need
to secure supplies of water for Egypt, which pervades the British im-
perial policy and also impacts international relations from the end of
the 1880s, particularly in relation to France. The Fashoda Incident in
1898 is frequently considered a symbol of British-French competition
in North-East Africa, but does this episode, written by an expedition
led by ambitious Major Marchand also have a “water aspect”?
In the case of Egypt, water, as an irreplaceable material, was a key
requirements for the survival of its population and the key to prosper-
ity. At the end of the 19th century theNile River also became a keystone
of the imperial interests of Great Britain in Africa, and therefore also
found itself the focus of attention in Paris. This article endeavours not
to be, in the words of Terje Tvedt, “blind to water”,4 to consider the
Nile an important element of policies and international relations and
to utilise and process other types of material, such as technical, hydro-
logical reports, projects, etc. to view British (and French) involvement
in the Nile basin from an alternative viewpoint.
3 T. TVEDT, Hydrology and Empire: The Nile, Water Imperialism and the Partition of
Africa, in: The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 39, 2, 2011, pp. 173–194.
The “Blind to Water” mainstream historiography may be represented by the influ-
ential monograph about Victorian imperialism: R. ROBINSON – J. GALLAGHER,
Africa and the Victorians. The Official Mind of Imperialism. London 1961.
4 T. TVEDT, The Nile in the Age of the British, Political Ecology and the Quest for Economic
Power, London 2016, p. 20.
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The Beginnings of the “Blue Thread” – the Roots of British Interest
on the Nile
During the 19th century the British considered the Nile, and sufficient
water in the river, to be important for several reasons. The first reason
was their economic interest, chiefly in relation to production of high-
quality long-staple cotton, which was increasingly becoming an irre-
placeable raw material for the English textile industry.5 Another rea-
son was support of the Egyptian economy, so that the country would
be capable of repaying its loans to foreign creditors, particularly En-
glish banks. And finally, the British considered the overall stability
of a country, which provided a connection to the “jewel of the impe-
rial crown” – India – to be important. The importance of Egypt as a
transit node increased after the Suez Canal was opened in 1869. All
these reasons were closely related to the water in the Nile, assurance
of which logically became a keystone in the British Empire’s policy to-
wards Egypt and gradually de facto towards the basin of the longest
African river.
British merchants had played first violin in Egypt since the first half
of the 19th century. For example, 187 British ships docked in the har-
bour at Alexandria in 1845 transporting 46,220 tons of goods in a total
value of £869,947, which is significantly more than French merchants
managed (68 ships, 11,719 tons worth £364,898).6 Cotton gradually be-
came export article number one. Muhammad Ali (1805–1849) started
large-scale cotton production in Egypt. The beginnings of mechanisa-
tion and development of cotton production in Egypt was linked to
British merchants from 1820 and their numbers increasingly domi-
nated this sector.7
The textile industry in Lancashire in England was dependent on
supplies of cotton. At the beginning of the 1860s 80 % of all cotton in
5 Long-staple cotton spread in Egypt after 1821 thanks to French textile engineer Louis
Alexis Jumel. It replaced the previously widespread, but poorer quality short-staple
cotton and also quickly replaced wheat as the most important Egyptian export crop.
6 The National Archives London-Kew (hereinafter TNA), Foreign Office (hereinafter
FO) 881/44 – Stoddart to Palmerston, On Egypt and on the Policy of Great Britain in
that Country, February 1847.
7 W. BEINART – L. HUGHES, Environment and Empire, Oxford 2007, p. 142; G. AL-
LEAUME, An Industrial Revolution in Agriculture? Some Observation on the Evo-
lution of Rural Egypt in the Nineteenth Century, in: A. BOWMAN – E. ROGAN
(eds.), Agriculture in Egypt, Oxford 1999, p. 341.
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the warehouses of the local textile factories came from plantations in
the southern states of the USA. After the Civil War erupted in 1861,
this “cotton dependency” was revealed as very problematic, because
the price of the rawmaterial increased significantly as the conflict pro-
gressed. Egypt became one of the main alternative suppliers due to
easy access and the high quality of local cotton.8 While 596,200 kantars
of cotton were exported from Egypt in 1861, 721,052 kantars were ex-
ported a year later and 1,181,888 kantars were exported in 1863.9 With
regard to British imports of Egyptian cotton, in 1861 Britain
imported 365,108 kantars worth 1,546,898 pounds, a year later it im-
ported 526,897 kantars worth 3,723,440 ponds and in 1863 a total of
835,289 kantars worth a total 8,841,557 pounds was imported. In sub-
sequent years the volume of exported cotton remained above one mil-
lion kantars and the price above 12 million pounds.10 The rising vol-
ume of exports resulted in increasing production, during the
1885–1889 period nearly 3 million kantars of cotton was produced on
average per year, and during the last decade of the 19th century the av-
erage volume of production was 6 million kantars.11 However, long-
staple cotton (Gossypium barbadense) is a plant that requires regular and
abundant moisture, so you could say that one end of the highly prof-
itable cotton fibre stretching between Manchester and Cairo began in
the waters of the Nile.
Under the rulers Abbas I. (1849–1854), Said (1854–1863) and Ismail
(1863–1879) the Egyptian economy found itself in great difficulty
thanks to a policy of enormous loans and credit. The creditors were
frequently British banking houses, for instance in 1864 Khedive Is-
mail obtained a loan from the English banking house of Fruhling &
Goschen in the value of 5,704,200 Egyptian Pounds and another loan in
the sum of 3,000,000 Egyptian Pounds from the same bank two years
8 “kantar” – unit of weight; its size varied, 1 kantar is approximately equal to 50 kg;
R. OWEN, Cotton and Egyptian Economy 1820–1914. A Study in Trade and Development,
Oxford 1969, pp. 89–90; Ch. ISSAWI, An Economic History of the Middle East and North
Africa, New York 1982, pp. 30–31.
9 A.E. CROUCHLEY, The Economic Development of Modern Egypt, London 1938, p. 263;
BEINART – HUGHES, p. 142; J. VALKOUN, Egypt under Khedive Ismail, in: Prague
Papers on the History of International Relations, 2, 2010, pp. 84–85.
10 OWEN, p. 90.
11 R. OWEN, A Long Look at Nearly Two Centuries of Long Staple Cotton, in: A. BOW-
MAN – E. ROGAN (eds.), Agriculture in Egypt, Oxford 1999, p. 349.
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later, in 1867 he obtained a loan of 11,890,000 Egyptian Pounds from
the English Bank of Oppenheim, Nephew & Co. and a number of other
private and public loans from other creditors.12 George J. Goschen
(1831–1907), a member of Russell’s government and the director of the
Bank of England, whose authority the Khedive’s administration had the
take into account, personally protected the interests of English hold-
ers of government bonds in Cairo in 1876.13 In 1882 Egypt’s foreign
debt reached the sum of £100,000,000 with an annual debt service of
£5,000,000, most of which ended up in Britain.14 In any case, it was
in the interests of British creditors to support Egypt’s ability to re-
pay its debts and this ability was dependent on water in the case of
a country whose main economic sector was agriculture. The equation
was simple, especially when themost lucrative export commoditywas
“thirsty” cotton and sugar cane: if there is no water – there will be no
harvest, if there is no harvest – there will be nothing to repay the debts
with.15
After control over Egypt was actually assumed following the Urabi
Revolution in 1882, securing sources of water by sufficient use of the
Nile became a key priority for the Brits. Reformation of the Egyp-
tian irrigation system had been commenced with the participation of
French experts during the rule of Muhammad Ali (1805–1849), but
many projects had not been completed and others were damaged at
the turn of the eighteen seventies and eighteen eighties. During the
Urabi Revolution, Egyptian nationalists sabotaged a number of wa-
ter works, because they realised their importance to the Khedive’s
pro-European administration and to the economic interests of foreign
powers.16 Henry Villiers Stuart (1827–1895), who carried out an
12 A.C. TUNÇER, Sovereign Debt and International Financial Control, The Middle East and
the Balkan 1870–1914, London 2015, p. 32. Other creditors included for example the
Anglo-Egyptien Bank or the Imperial Ottoman Bank, in which British financiers had
significant interest. More about Egyptian foreign loans: R. OWEN, The Middle East in
the World Economy, 1800–1914, London 1993, p. 127; CROUCHLEY, pp. 119–120.
13 TNA, FO 407/9, Correspondence respecting the Finances of Egypt, 1877, Nos. 141,
142, 143, 144.
14 TVEDT, The Nile in the Age, p. 21; CROUCHLEY, p. 145.
15 The volume of exports of sugar cane could not compete with cotton, in spite of the
fact that it became a sought-after export commodity, particularly at the end of the
sixties.
16 TVEDT, The Nile in the Age, p. 20; N. SMITH, A History of Dams, London 1971, p. 188.
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inspection trip through Lower and Upper Egypt, mentions the possi-
bility of an “enormous increase in yields (of cotton) in the Delta, if irrigation
is assured” in his report, he also believed that there was great potential
in the event of sufficient irrigation of the area of Upper Egypt.17
At the initiative of Evelyn Baring, British Consul General and Agent
in Egypt, royal engineers who had extensive experience from irriga-
tion projects in India were invited to the country in order to reinforce
the Egyptian Irrigation Department and Works operating under theMin-
istry of Public Works.18 These engineers, led by Colin Scott-Moncrieff
(1836–1916), started systematic work on the Nile and the country’s ir-
rigation system.19 One of the first issues that these British engineers
had to deal with was the Delta Barrage, a non-functional project by
Muhammad Ali dating from the eighteen thirties, which Frenchmen
Maurice Linant de Bellefonds (1798–1883) and Eugéne Mougel (1808
to 1890) were involved in. As a result of damming the Rosetta and
Damietta branches of the Nile, this project should have raised the level
of the river and therefore the level of the water in the canal system,
which could have been made shallower as a result.20 Partial modifi-
cations to the dam in 1884 contributed to increasing yields from the
harvest (particularly cotton), and overall revitalisation of irrigation,
the most important element of which was naturally repairs to the Bar-
rage, contributed to an enormous increase in the area of usable soil,
which led to the volume of cotton production doubling during the
period from 1888 to 1892.21 In addition to renovation of the Barrage,
17 TNA, FO 633/49, Reports by Mr Villiers Stuart, M.P., respecting Reorganization in
Egypt, 1883.
18 William Willcocks (1852–1932), Robert Hanbury Brown (1849–1926), Justin C. Ross,
William Ried etc. For more detail see C. ANDERSEN, British Engineers and Africa
1875–1914, Cambridge 2011; E. SANDES, The Royal Engineers in Egypt and the Sudan,
Chatham 1937.
19 Egypt was divided into 5 “district” for easier organisation for the purpose of mainte-
nance and establishment of irrigation. The head of each district was the head en-
gineer. TNA, FO 633/49 – Further Correspondence respecting Reorganization in
Egypt, Dufferin to Granville, No. 43, February 1883.
20 More about the Delta Barrage: J. MAZANEC, The Delta Barrage – the Most Expen-
sive Bridge of Its Time? The First Attempts at Taming the Nile, in: Prague Papers on
the History of International Relations, 2, 2017, pp. 21–31; R.H. BROWN, History of The
Barrage at The Head of Delta of Egypt, Cairo 1896; R.H. BROWN, The Delta Barrage of
Lower Egypt, Cairo 1902.
21 CROUCHLEY, p. 148; In 1879, i.e. before the barrage was repaired, cotton production
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the Rosetta canal was also completed, the Ismail and Ibrahim canals
were made deeper, several pumping stations were established, modi-
fications were made at the Faiyum Oasis and tens of smaller projects
were also realised.22 The British essentially realised that the wealth of
Egypt is dependent on water and its irrigation system.23
It may seem that the British held a monopoly over all the inno-
vations in relation to the Nile in Egypt in the eighteen eighties, but
this was not completely true. For instance in 1880 the Frenchman de
la Motte proposed construction of a dam at a site called Gebel Sil-
sila.24 Two years later American Cope Whitehouse designed a dam at
Wadi Rayan, which he vainly strove to have realised for several years
– against the negative standpoint of the British-Egyptian administra-
tion.25 A number of similar projects also existed “on paper”.26
The turn of the eighteen eighties and eighteen nineties revealed sev-
eral weak points in the British efforts on the Nile. The rising volume
of profitable cotton production was paradoxically one of these weak
points – in 1886 cotton was grown over 866,000 feddan, in 1893 this
area increased to 966,000 feddan and a year later to nearly 1,100,000
feddan, which increased demands for irrigation at specific times of the
year significantly.27 Another concern for members of the British ad-
ministration was the population boom – in 1873 there were 5.3 million
people living in Egypt.28 By 1882 the population had risen to 7.9 mil-
lion and at the end of the century in 1897 there was a population of
approximately 9.7 million living in Egypt.29 The increasing number of
achieved 3,186,060 kantars, in 1884 this volumewas 3,630,000 kantars, i.e., nearly half
a million kantar more, OWEN, Cotton and Egyptian Economy, p. 197.
22 J. ROSS, Report of the Administration of the Department of Irrigation for the year 1890,
Cairo 1891; J. ROSS, Report of the Administration of the Department of Irrigation for the
year 1889, Cairo 1890; C. SCOTT-MONCRIEFF, Irrigation Report for the year 1888, Cairo
1889; SCOTT-MONCRIEFF, Irrigation Report for the year 1887, Cairo 1888.
23 R. TIGNOR, Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882–1914, Princeton
1966, p. 112.
24 Central Archives Diplomatique duNantes (hereinafter referred to as CADN), 353 PO
– 2/273, Note relative au projet de Monsieur de la Motte.
25 C. COOKSON-HILLS, Engineering the Nile: Irrigation and the British Empire in Egypt,
1882–1914, Ph.D. thesis, Queen’s University, Kingston 2013, pp. 255–266.
26 TVEDT, The Nile in the Age, p. 22.
27 OWEN, The Middle East, p. 218.
28 Ministre de L’Intérieur, Statistique de L’Égypte Année 1873, Caire 1873, p. 13.
29 OWEN, The Middle East, p. 217; J. WATERBURY, Hydropolitics of The Nile Valley, Syra-
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people naturally required more water. The weak floods in 1888–1889,
when the fields in some areas could not be irrigated at all, demon-
strated the destructive power of drought, however, excessively pow-
erful, uncontrollable flooding was just as dangerous.30 At the begin-
ning of the nineties the demand for water in Egypt slowly began to
reach the limits of the available capacity and the gentlemen in Cairo
and London were forced to consider what should be done next. With
regard to the need to retain more and more water, it seemed that con-
struction of more dams would be inevitable, the pressure of various
groups of society and the circumstances could no longer be overlook-
ed if the British wished to maintain their position on the Nile and pro-
tect their interests. Nubar Pasha (1825–1899), the Egyptian PrimeMin-
ister, concisely summarised the position of Egypt in his well-known
quote: “The Egyptian question is the irrigation question.”31 Egypt’s water
capacity was nearly exhausted, however the water capacity of the Nile
offered much greater potential. The logical way to acquire more water
and protect against the uncontrollable flood wave lay further up the
river, which people in London and Cairo, who were familiar with Nile
hydrology, were most probably well aware of, and so their attention
was directed towards Aswan and further south – to Sudan.
Up River – the British Journey to Sudan
The report dating from 1894, executed by engineers from the Min-
istry of Public Works under the leadership of William Willcocks, pro-
vided hard data. It would be necessary to store 1,500,000,000 m3 of
water every year for future agricultural requirements in Lower Egypt.
Upper Egypt, with a less developed irrigation system, would require
a supply of 950,000,000 m3 of water every year to the north of Asyut
and a supply of 1,160,000,000 m3 every year was estimated for the
area to the south of Asyut.32 If storage of this volume of 3,610,000,000
m3 of water could be achieved, then the area of farmland in Egypt
would be increased from 4,955,000 acres to 5,555,000 acres and rev-
enue could increase from 32,315,000 Egyptian Pounds to 38,540,000
cuse 1979, p. 36.
30 W. WILLCOCKS, Report on Perennial Irrigation and Flood Protection of Egypt, Cairo
1894, p. 8. Willcocks also considers the period of 1877–1878 to be similarly critical.
31 TVEDT, Hydrology and Empire, p. 176.
32 WILLCOCKS, p. 9.
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Egyptian Pounds.33 The question was, where to get this water, or more
precisely, where to store it.
William Willcocks came up with a solution in 1894, when he pro-
posed construction of a dam on the first Nile cataract at Aswan.34 The
original plan was to make a reservoir, which would contain
3,700,000,000 m3 of water.35 Even though this was a project for the
“largest dam in the world” it started to become evident that, from
the long-term aspect, it would be unable to meet the demands of the
thirsty Egyptian agriculture, because for technical reasons (chiefly due
to the amount of sediment carried down from the Ethiopian high-
lands) the dam could only offer the capacity for storage of just
2,500,000,000 m3 of water.36 However, this estimated capacity was re-
duced even further, because it originally assumed the flooding of an-
cient temples on Philae Island, which resulted in a wave of outrage
across Europe.37 British and French archaeologists protested, as well as
for example M. E. Boulé, a French member of the international Techni-
cal Commission, which evaluated Willcocks’ project: “[. . . ] I said, and I
insist, that I absolutely refuse to be linked to such a proposal. If I agreed (with
Willcocks’ proposal) I would deserve to be condemned by the public opinion
of all of Europe.”38 Robert Collins calls reduction of the capacity of the
dam, which was actually initiated by Sir Benjamin Baker (1840–1907),
to be a foolish effort to gain the support of the French – the temples in
Philae were described in the famousDescription de’l Egypte, which was
very popular in France.39 Reduction of the capacity of the planned
33 Ibidem, p. 5.
34 There had been speculation about construction of a reservoir at this site since 1891,
when Willcocks was appointed Director of Reservoir Studies, however, a specific plan
only arose from the report dated 1894. R. OWEN, Lord Cromer, Victorian Imperialist,
Edwardian Proconsul, Oxford 2004, p. 287.
35 W. WILLCOCKS, Egyptian Irrigation, Vol. 2, London 1913, p. 686.
36 M. ABBAS, The Sudan Question, The Dispute over the Anglo-Egyptian Cindominium
1884–1951, New York 1952, pp. 77–78.
37 The final project of Aswan dam could only store 1,065,000,000 m3 of water; WILL-
COCKS, Egyptian Irrigation, p. 686.
38 CADN, 353 PO – 2/274, Rapport de la Commission technique designér pour examiner les
projets de reservoár du Nil, Le Caire, le 10 avril 1894. Rapport de M. Boulé, Inspecreur
général, Membre du Conseil général des Ponts et Chaussérs á Paris, Le Caire, le 18 avril
1894. More about the “Philae case” see ANDERSEN, pp. 137–160.
39 R. COLLINS, The Nile, London 2002, p. 144;Description de’l Egypte, Vol. 1, Planche 26,
Paris 1809.
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dam by over half would save the monuments on Philae Island, but
this would mean that Egypt would still need 2,610,000,000 m3 of wa-
ter, which had to be found somewhere. Due to the sediment carried
by the water from the Ethiopian Highlands, this had to be somewhere
above the of tributary of the Atbara River, in front of which a solid
dam of the usual type could not be built, because it would be at risk of
breaking due to the build-up of sediment.40 British “Nile tamers” logi-
cally started to focus their attention even higher up the river – because
their success in Egypt depended on sufficient supplies of water!
Because long-term assurance of supplies of water in Egypt was im-
possible without development of the Upper Nile, the Brits decided to
occupy Sudan. But where did the idea to control and utilise the Upper
Nile originate?
Explorer Samuel Baker (1821–1893), who set out on an expedition to
the source of the Nile in the eighteen sixties, which provided extensive
knowledge about its hydrology, wrote the following in 1867: “From im-
memorial, the rise of the Nile has been watched with intense interest at the
usual season, but no attempt has been made to insure a supply of water to
Egypt during all seasons. . . ” Baker speaks of the possibility of creating
“great reservoirs on various levels of Egypt, from Khartoum to the Mediter-
ranean,” he mentions a “series of dams or weirs on the Nile, which could
raise the level of the river (to the level necessary for irrigation)”.41 William
Garstin (1849–1925) wrote in his report about the plannedAswanDam
in 1894: “I think, then, we may confidently predict that, if a reservoir be suc-
cessfully constructed, it will only one of a chain which will eventually extend
from the first Cataract to the junction of the White and the Blue Niles in
Khartoum.”42 He also assumed that when the Aswan Dam was com-
pleted and people realised its benefits, construction of another dam to
the south would simply be a matter of time.43 A year later, on 24 Jan-
uary 1895, Colin Scott-Moncrieff asked a rhetorical question at the end
of his speech at the meeting of the Royal Institution of Great Britain in
40 TVEDT, Hydrology and Empire, p. 180.
41 S. BAKER, The Nile Tributaries of Abyssinia and The Sword Hunters of The Hamran Arabs,
London 1867, pp. 566–568. Baker was also the first to mention the possibility of con-
structing a dam on the first Nile cataract at Aswan (p. 567).
42 Reservoirs in The Valley of The Nile – prepared for The Committee of The Society for The
Preservation of The Monuments of Ancient Egypt, London 1894, pp. 10–11.
43 TNA, FO 407/131, Lord Cromer to Earl of Kimberley, Annual Report, Inclosure 3 in
No. 51, Note upon the Public Works Department for the year 1894.
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London: “is it not evident, that the Nile from Lake Victoria Nyanza to the
Mediterranean should be under one rule?”44
After the death of Gordon in the eighteen eighties, Lord Cromer,
a pivotal figure of the British establishment in Egypt, expressed his
opinion against occupation of Sudan – “all the authorities here (in Cairo)
except myself are in favour of an advance on Dongola. The Egyptian au-
thorities favour the idea, because they regard it as the first step towards
the reconquest of the Sudan.”45 Cromer believed that Britain was not
materially prepared for occupation of the country and that the circum-
stances were not in its favour. However, Cromer changed his opin-
ion at the beginning of the nineties and started to write about North-
Sudanese Dongola as just a springboard for further progress in the
direction of Berber and Khartoum.46 The water management situation
in Egypt certainly played a role in this, whereas during the eighties
many projects were realised and there was “room for improvement”
in the field of securing supplies of water, but Egypt started to reach its
limits after 1890.
From 1885 the Mahdist state in Sudan also represented an obstacle
to discovering the hydrology of the Nile – in the nineties the river was
still mostly unexplored and shrouded in mystery.47 Another issue was
the loss of access to data from the nilometers in Khartoum, fromwhich
daily telegraphic reports about the water level in the river were sent to
Egypt from 1885. Thewater managers were able to regulate the system
more accurately thanks to this data.48
The goal of the British was to launch a campaign against Sudan
not only under the flag of the Union, but under the flag of Egypt
44 C. SCOTT-MONCRIEFF, The Nile. Notices of the Proceedings at the Meetings of the Mem-
bers of the Royal Institution of Great Britain, with Abstracts and Discourses delivered at the
Evening Meetings. Vol. XIV. 1893–1895, London 1896, p. 418.
45 TNA, FO 633/6, Lord Cromer to Lord Rosebery, No. 50, February 23, 1886. General
Charles Gordon (1833–1885) was killed by the Mahdists during the fall of Khartoum
in 1885. His death became a symbol, which was subsequently used as propaganda
during the Sudan campaign.
46 TVEDT, Hydrology and Empire, p. 183.
47 In 1895 Colin Scott-Moncrieff himself, one of Cromer’s chief water management en-
gineers, marked the southern-most point of the Nile that he had personally visited.
This was Philae Island, he only knew about the rest from the travelogues and reports
of Baker, Speke and others. SCOTT-MONCRIEFF, The Nile, p. 405.
48 There was another functional nilometer at Dakle in 1875 on the Nile tributary of the
Atbara River. TVEDT, The Nile in the Age, p. 26.
51
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
West Bohemian Historical Review IX j 2019 j 1
(or under both flags at once), for political and economic reasons. An-
other challenge was acquiring the necessary funds. The Egyptian gov-
ernment finally requested release of 500,000 Egyptian Pounds from
the reserve fund, which was successfully achieved on the soil of the
International Caisse de la Dette Commission, which supervised Egyp-
tian funds, thanks to British diplomatic support. As a result, Egyptian
soldiers were deployed using Egyptian funds.49 In 1897 Cromer asked
London for financial support, also in part because he was concerned
that the Egyptian budget would be unable to cover the expensive Su-
danese campaign and the costly investment into construction of the
dam in Aswan, which he considered crucial: “we have all of us here been
working at this reservoir plan for several years, and I confess that, now that
we have so nearly attained success, I am very unvilling to let the opportu-
nity slip by.” He considered the most logical route to be first of all to
complete the dam and then to launch the campaign against Sudan,
however “one cannot always choose in advance,” and it was too late to
cry over spilt milk.50 The financiers in London decided to support the
dam project and the Sudanese campaign was financed from the Egyp-
tian budget.51
And what does this all mean? The Brits only entered Sudan when
Egypt’s water potential had been exhausted. The campaign to con-
quer Sudan was launched under the command of Horatio Kitchener
(1850–1916), Sirdar of the Egyptian Army, in 1896. The campaign was
subsequently renamed The River War by a young solider and news re-
porter called Winston Churchill. The primary goal of this campaign
was to secure a sufficient supply of water for Egypt and its cotton
plantations by controlling the Upper Nile. As Churchill said: “In the
account of the River War the Nile is naturally supreme. It is the great melody
that recurs throughout the whole opera. The general purposing military op-
erations, the statesman who would decide upon grave policies, and the reader
desirous of studying the course and results of either, must think of the Nile.”52
49 TVEDT, Hydrology and Empire, p. 184.
50 TNA, Cabinet papers (hereinafter CAB) 37/44/27, Lord Cromer to Marquess of Sal-
isbury, June 5, 1897.
51 TNA, CAB 37/44/29 Treasury to Foreign Office, No. 3, June 2, 1897.
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“The Nile – a Great Melody that recurs throughout the Whole
Opera” and Many Potential Conductors in the Hall
The Brits had considered the entire Nile Valley under their sphere of
influence and under their control since the beginning of the eighteen
nineties. Control over the river became a crucial matter. Regarding the
enormous area of the region it could be presumed that London, or
more precisely Cairo, would not be the only players in the game. Con-
cerns about occupation of strategic areas on the Upper Nile and the
possibility of harming Egypt through regulation of the river did arise,
but was there any actual risk of danger?
In his work about nilometers, which was published in January 1889,
Colonel Ardagh (1840–1907) mentions the hypothetical possibility of
the rulers of Ethiopia cutting Egypt off from the water supply. Al-
though he admits that there are no indications that something like this
would happen, in the same breath he adds that Egypt would be subject
to the whims of any advanced civilisation that would expertly control
the Atbara, White and Blue Nile and the Bahr al-Ghazal rivers. Ac-
cording to Ardagh the interests of Egypt and Sudan are inseparable.53
In December of the same year Evelyn Baring wrote to Salisbury about
the activities of the Italians, who, in his words: “perhaps find Abyssinia
rather too hard a nut to crack. Anyhow they are now evidently making serious
advances towards the Sudan. If they are allowed to do this they will soon clash
with our Egyptian policy. If they succeeded they will do permanent harm to
Egypt and to us [. . . ]. I hope you will say ‘Hands off’ to them as regards Kas-
sala and the Nile Valley [. . . ]. The matter is really one of great importance.”54
The Anglo-Italian protocol was signed on 15 April 1891, whereas the
Italian government pledged to refrain from executing any water man-
agement project on the Atbara River, which wouldmarkedly influence
the flow of water into the Nile in Article III of this protocol.55 The Ital-
ians did not represent a real threat to British plans in the Nile Valley
52 W. CHURCHILL, The River War, An Account of the Reconquest of the Sudan, New York
2006, p. 4.
53 TNA, PRO 30/40/9/6, J. C. ARDAGH, Nilometers, in: Proceedings of the Royal Geo-
graphical Society and Monthly Record of Geography, January No., 1889.
54 TNA, FO 633/6, Evelyn Baring to Lord Salisbury, No. 150, December 15, 1889. Kas-
sala is a Sudanese town on the Mareb River near the borders with Eritrea – it can be
considered an access point to the area of the Atbara River, a major tributary of the
Nile.
55 TVEDT, The Nile in the Age, p. 40.
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in the nineties. In his speech on 24 January 1895 Colin Scott-Moncrieff
actually describes them as a “nation that is consistantly the most friendly
towards us (the British)”.56 With regard to Ethiopia, a treaty of friend-
ship and business relations was concluded with Emperor Menelik II
on 14 May 1897. Thanks to skilful diplomacy, the Brits were able to re-
solve a potential headache and acquire another safeguard against the
Italians.57
From the aspect of controlling the White Nile, it was strategic to ac-
quire control of its source and therefore the region of Buganda, which
was the site of the outflow from Lake Victoria Nyanza. The Brits de-
clared a protectorate here in 1894.58
The treaties concluded with Germany (24 June and 1 July 1890) and
the Belgian King Leopold II in 1894 could be considered another vic-
tory achievedwithout practically any shots being fired. For the price of
several concessions these documents confirmed the Nile Valley to be
a British sphere of influence.59 After conclusion of these treaties only
the French remained in the Nile Valley, as the only other “potential
conductor” in addition to the Brits. Were the interests of Paris a threat
to the British-Egyptian plans in North-East Africa?
French interests in the area of the Upper Nile were marginal. The
area of the Egyptian issue, which continued to incite a feeling of injus-
tice and nostalgia in relation to the times of Muhammad Ali, when
France played “first violin” in Egypt, in the French, was only uni-
fied by events in the nineties. The Anglo-German treaty dating from
1890 resulted in noisy protests in Paris and the so-called Grey Declara-
tion dating from 1895, when, during his speech before the chamber of
deputies, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
56 SCOTT-MONCRIEFF, The Nile, p. 418.
57 TNA, WO 106/219, Précis of Events on the Upper Nile and Adjacent Territories, Ap-
pendix F. Another agreement was subsequently concluded with Menelik II in 1902,
in which the emperor pledged to refrain from building or permitting construction
of any works on the Blue Nile, Sobata or Lake Tana, which would stop the flow of
Nile waters, without an agreement with the government of His British Majesty and
the government of Sudan. This agreement continues to influence events in the Nile
Basin to this day, for instance in relation to the dispute regarding construction of the
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).
58 TNA, WO 106/220, Short History of Events on the Upper Nile, 1899, pp. 2–3.
59 TVEDT, The Nile in the Age, p. 43; ROBINSON – GALLAGHER, p. 293. One of the
concessions to Germany was withdrawal from Helgoland Island in the North Sea
for example.
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Sir Edward Grey (1862–1933) informed the French that “Any interfer-
ence in the Nile Valley could be considered an unfriendly act and would be so
viewed by England”, caused even more outrage.60 He de facto bluntly
declared the Nile Valley a British sphere of influence.
The French position in the Nile area was not considered strong and
this is also demonstrated by Cromer’s letter to Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs Lord Kimberly (1826–1902) dated June 1894, in which
he writes that he will be vigilant if the French start moving in Africa.
“I can probably counter them here,” and he also adds that he personally
has no problem ceding large territories in the interior but that he con-
siders the coast with the water ways to be important – and the Nile the
most important of these. “I think that the French should be kept outside of
the Nile Valley.”61
France (on the contrary to Britain) had no complex concept encom-
passing utilisation and development of the Nile’s water supply. De-
spite this there is a theory for use of the Nile by the French as a sort
of “water weapon” against the British and their interests down river.
This theoryworkwith the concept of constructing a dam higher up the
Nile and possibly opening it suddenly and flooding everything below
it, particularly Egypt. The Nile is linked to the so-called Fashoda Cri-
sis in 1898 in relation to this idea. Can the “blue thread” be discovered
here?62 Was this crisis a true reason for concerns in London and Cairo?
The goal of this article is not a complete analysis of the Fashoda Crisis,
rather it is concerned with the water aspect.63
The chimeric Fashoda theory as a key to controlling the Nile can
be described as follows. Between 1892 and 1893 the French decided to
60 TNA, WO 106/219, p. 14; R. BROWN, Fashoda Reconsidered, The Impact of Domestic
Politics on French Policy in Africa 1893–1898, London 1970, pp. 34–35; G.N. SANDER-
SON, England, Europe and The Upper Nile 1882–1899, Edinburgh 1966, pp. 114–115.
61 TNA, FO 633/6, Lord Cromer to Lord Kimberley, No. 217, June 2, 1894. The report
also proves that the Brits were interested in Sudan chiefly because of the Nile, the
remainder (particularly the southern area of the country) was worthless to them, in
the words of Lord Salisbury, it was “wretched stuff”. TNA, PRO 78/5051, Minute on
a report, October 20, 1898.
62 Fashoda is a town on the White Nile in the northeast of South Sudan, now called
Kodok.
63 Details regarding the issue of the Fashoda Crisis J. VALKOUN, Fašodská krize 1898:
vyvrcholení britsko-francouzského souperˇení v oblasti horního Nilu, in: Historický
obzor, 21, 7/8, 2010, pp. 146–153; D. BATES, The Fashoda Incident of 1898: Encounter on
the Nile, Oxford 1984.
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expand from Lake Chad in the direction of Bahr al-Ghazal and into the
valley of the Upper Nile. The Fashoda Fortress located by the source of
the Nile was the strategic centre of this region.64 The French believed
that construction of a dam at the site of the source of the Nile could
weaken the British position in Egypt.65 The name of French engineer
Victor Prompt is frequently mentioned in relation to this idea. He al-
legedly expressed the idea of damming the Nile at Fashoda for the
purpose of exposing Egypt to the threat of drought or sudden flood-
ing within the terms of his speech “Soudan Nilotique”, held on 20 Jan-
uary 1893 at the Cairo Institut Égyptien. His words inlfuenced French
Minister of Foreign Affairs Théophile Delcassé (1852–1923) who dis-
seminated them in imperialistic circles in Paris.66 Prompt’s speech al-
legedly also convinced the Brits that it was essential to occupy the
upper reaches of the river in order to prevent the French from con-
structing a potential dam.
Terje Tvedt refutes this theory. Victor Prompt never mentioned the
words historians Brown, Lewis and others attribute to him in his
speech. In his speeches, of which there were several, Prompt spoke
about the waning flow of the Nile as a result of climatic changes or re-
duction of water supplies, of the fact that Egypt should quickly occupy
Sudan in order to secure water supplies, which could not be secured
within its own territory, or about potential construction of three new
dams between Khartoum and Aswan. He also discussed use of the
Blue Nile for irrigation of Sudan, which, as he believed, would not im-
pact Egyptian agriculture.67 In his speech in January 1893, (which was
mainly intended for an Egyptian auditorium) he again emphasised oc-
cupation of Sudan and also spoke about a potential dam in Uganda,
from which Egypt could profit.68 He did not support the Brits in their
ambitions on the Nile (and Cromer does not mention him in his corre-
spondence with FO), on the contrary he pointed out the potential risks
64 BROWN, Fashoda Reconsidered, pp. 23–24.
65 D.L. LEWIS, The Race to Fashoda, European Colonialism and African Resistance in The
Scramble for Africa, London 1988, p. 48.
66 BROWN, Fashoda Reconsidered, p. 33; LEWIS, p. 48, etc.
67 See Prompt’s speeches at the Institut Égyptien dated 26 December 1891 on the topic
of Réservoirs d’eau de la Haute-Égypte, for example. CADN, 353 PO – 2/274.
68 TVEDT, Hydrology and Empire, pp. 185–186; TVEDT, The Nile in the Age, pp. 44–47.
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to Egypt arising from the British presence at the source of the Nile in
Uganda in his speeches. He never mentioned any French dam.69
Neither Prompt, nor anyone else believed that Fashoda was the key
to the Nile. Fashoda is not located by the source of the White Nile,
which is located 600 km to the south in Uganda, which was a known
fact in the nineties.70 Nor was it feasible to build a dam at Fashoda
– this is impossible due to the landscape, because the entire region is
flat, and then also because there is nothing to use as building material
within a radius of several miles, because Fashoda is surrounded by
swamps.71 Major Marchand also only had a handful of men available
with insufficient logistics.
From the hydrological aspect Fashoda was completely unimpor-
tant, the presence of a French military unit did not represent any sig-
nificant threat to British control over the river and was therefore no
threat to the British position in Cairo. Marchand’s expedition, playing
the role of scarecrow threatening British-Egyptian interests in the Nile
Valley, could serve as a reason to occupy South Sudan, which may
have been worthless from the aspect of its interior, but offered enor-
mous water potential thanks to its marshes, which the Brits purpose-
fully worked with subsequently.72 The Fashoda Crisis in 1898 was not
part of French plans to control and develop the Nile River, because the
French had no such plans.
Even though Fashoda itself is worthless from the hydrological as-
pect, the international impact of the Fashoda Incident can be linked to
the “blue thread”. After Marchand departed in November 1898 and
following the factual defeat suffered by France in this case, both par-
ties signed a convention to define their spheres of influence on
21 March 1899. This concerned a convention concerning the area to
the east and west of the Niger River and on the Upper Nile, expanded
by Article IV. which basically made the valley of the longest African
River an exclusively British matter.73 Colin Scott-Moncrieff’s dream
69 TVEDT, Hydrology and Empire, p. 186.
70 E.g., from Samuel Baker’s travelogues and reports. He had been to the African lakes
and was also very familiar with Fashoda, because it was his seat when he was ap-
pointed governor of the region under Khedive Ismail in the sixties. Ibidem.
71 ROBINSON – GALLAGHER, p. 376.
72 W.GARSTIN,Report upon the Basin of The Upper Nile with Proposals for The Improvement
of that River, Cairo 1904.
73 The document is sometimes also known under the title of the “Nigeria Convention”.
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(and probably the dream of many other men in London and Cairo)
became reality – the Nile River, from Lake Victoria Nyanza to the
Mediterranean Sea de facto fell under the control of a single govern-
ment.74 The “Nile Symphony” had found its conductor.
Conclusion
After the cannons of British warships roared off the coast of Alexan-
dria on 11 July 1882 and the occupation of Egypt commenced, securing
supplies of water for Egypt – and thereby stimulation of the Egyptian
economy, became a crucial matter for London due to Great Britain’s
economic interests and its desire to maintain stability in the coun-
try. The chief export commodities, sugar cane, and most importantly
“thirsty” cotton, grown on an increasingly larger scale, as well as the
population boom, brought Egypt to the limits of its water potential
at the end of the eighteen nineties, even though development of the
water management system continued.
Reports by Cromer’s engineers and other archive material confirms
the thesis of Norwegian historian and geographer Terje Tvedt, that se-
curing supplies of water for Egypt in the interests of maintaining their
own position, was the main motive for the British-Egyptian campaign
against Sudan in 1896. It was not about becoming the “master of the
desert”.75 Sudan had enormous water potential, Cromer knew this, he
was not interested in creating a buffer zone, he was not interested in
the expansive interior, he was interested in waterways and the Nile in
particular.76
The Fashoda Incident in 1898 is often considered a symbol of
British-French competition in North-East Africa, however, there is no
direct interest in water on the French part. First because Fashoda is
worthless in relation to control over the river. Secondly because France
had no complex concept encompassing use and development the Nile
as a supply of water. By signing the expanded Nigeria Convention
dated 21 March 1899, the Brits became a hegemon in the basin of the
longest African River and the Nile had no further significant impact
on relations between London and Paris.
TNA, FO 93/33/173.
74 SCOTT-MONCRIEFF, The Nile, p. 418.
75 ROBINSON – GALLAGHER, p. 272.
76 TNA, FO 633/6, Lord Cromer to Lord Kimberley, No. 217, June 2, 1894.
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